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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of expressive association under the First Amendment is 
relatively new, with roots in Supreme Court doctrine tracing back only about 
a half century.1  Further, First Amendment expressive association principles 
are swiftly developing and expanding in a pattern begun only over the last 
decade or so.2  Today, the very concept of expressive association is 
undergoing rapid evolution, and the nature of constitutional protection is in a 
state of considerable flux.3 
While not formally recognized under the First Amendment, expressive 
associations have existed for centuries in America in the form of religious, 
political, and interest groups of virtually all stripes.4  This history is so deep-
seated that one scholar recently suggested that expressive activity by groups 
is more basic and more important to the role of freedom of speech in our 
democracy than speech by individuals.5 
Simply stated, expressive association is “a right to associate for the 
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—
 
 1.  The case generally considered foundational is NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449 (1958). 
 2.  Among the recent cases are Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California 
Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010); John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47 (2006); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 3.  Compare Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. 640, with Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876. 
 4.  See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 982–1001 (2011). 
 5.  Id. at 1024 (“[T]he associational speech perspective suggests that . . . sometimes such speech 
is entitled to more protection than individual speech because such associational speech contributes 
more directly to the core self-governance goals of the First Amendment.”). 
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speech, assembly, petition . . . and the exercise of religion.”6  Under that 
definition, it requires both an organization (the association itself) and a 
purpose (a First Amendment activity).7  The right protects both individuals 
and groups by limiting state interference in group activities even when the 
group’s purposes may seem distasteful, and by limiting state action against 
individuals who are part of such groups.8 
But a rapid evolution of this freedom of expressive association in the 
Supreme Court’s decisions has fostered considerable disorder in the settled 
free speech landscape, and its continued development is likely to introduce 
even further disarray.9  The uncertainty lies not only with the level of 
protection accorded associational expression, but more basically at the 
foundational, definitional level of what an expressive association is and what 
qualities it must possess to qualify for constitutional protection.  This 
confusion goes to the First Amendment purposes served by such 
associations and the various ways in which those purposes become manifest 
in the form of an expressive association, as well as the distinct kinds of 
expressive associations that exist and the distinct constitutional roles each 
fulfills.10 
Against this background of recent legal development and ongoing 
scholarly and judicial attention, we undertake our inquiry.  Our purposes are 
limited, but important.  Expressive associations, in our view, take many 
forms and serve many and diverse constitutional purposes.  The limits on 
those forms and purposes are barely discernible from the Supreme Court’s 
decisions; indeed, they are highly elastic and intertwined.11  Nonetheless, the 
law has developed and expanded sufficiently to make the setting of limits 
and the recognition of distinct typologies critical.12 
Our goal is to begin organizing, defining, and classifying these different 
 
 6.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 811 (2001) 
(Expressive association “protects organizations like the NAACP from being banned or persecuted 
because state actors do not like their First Amendment activity . . . .  It [also] protects an individual 
from being punished or harassed for being a member of an organization like the NAACP.”). 
 9.  See Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A 
Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515 (2001); Daniel A. Farber, Foreword, Speaking in the 
First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483 
(2001); Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. 
L. REV. 2353 (2000). 
 10.  See infra Part IV. 
 11.  See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 647–59. 
 12.  See infra Part IV. 
BEZANSON WHITE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  12:54 PM 
 
26 
typologies of expressive association by identifying their essential forms and 
the boundaries that should attach to the various and often overlapping forms 
of collective First Amendment activity.  To do so, we must traverse the 
entire range of collective organization activity in fields as diverse as 
education, commerce, religion, philosophy, research, self-reflection, and 
political or economic action.  Our goal is to cut across this wide array of 
collective or cooperative human activity by thinking about the essential 
forms that group expressive activity may take, and the justifications for 
extending special First Amendment protection to some of the forms but not 
others, and to some of the activities but not others.  In short, we hope to 
make a preliminary map of the legal landscape of expressive associations.  
In so doing, we begin to flush out the values inherent in each form and make 
broad suggestions as to the type of protection each may warrant. 
We do not purport to be exhaustive in our mapping, but we aim to 
identify the core elements of the key associational forms and the essential 
landscape of constitutional protection.  Part II briefly traces the Supreme 
Court’s path toward the right of expressive association.  Part III provides a 
general discussion of the role, if any, of substantive distinctions among 
beliefs in defining whether a group qualifies for constitutional protection as 
an expressive association. 
We then turn, in Part IV, to the core of our mapping exercise—
identifying the functional typologies.  We categorize these typologies by 
three key characteristics: inward-oriented expression versus outward-
oriented expression;13 heterogeneous versus homogeneous associations;14 
and finally, formed versus formless associations.15  In Part V, we conclude 
by reflecting on the First Amendment principles reflected through each 
typology. 
These are all deeply interrelated inquiries, so our organization will 
reflect the constantly circling and shifting course required to unwind, 
organize, and reveal a map.  Our conclusion will not be a test or a specific 
definition, but instead a better understanding of the new legal characters now 
populating the First Amendment landscape and a map of their domains. 
II.  THE PATH TO EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION 
Before embarking on our mapping exercise, we first explore briefly and 
generally the formal law of expressive association.  As this article will show, 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area of the law is far from 
 
 13.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 14.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 15.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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concrete;16 however, some basic principles can be gleaned from the Court’s 
decisions over the past decades.  These opinions mark the path from a 
general freedom to associate to the more specific right to associate for 
expressive purposes. 
Freedom of association is a free-standing right,17 and just as individuals 
have a right to associate with one another, they also have a right not to 
associate.18  Arguably, this freedom is driven, at least in part, by the idea of 
the “people” as sovereign.19  We could, thus, view the formation of an 
association through two lenses—both as a reflection of this individual 
sovereignty.  In one view, an association is formed based on the autonomous 
choice of individuals to join or not join together.20  On the other hand, the 
focus can be shifted to the association as a whole—what are the rights of the 
entity?21 
The Supreme Court has divided freedom of association into two 
categories—intimate associations and expressive associations.22  Intimate 
associations, such as familial relationships, are those deriving from the term 
“liberty” found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.23  In contrast, 
expressive associations form in order to engage, at least in part, in activities 
protected by the First Amendment.24  However, these groups need not be 
engaged in advocacy25 or formed for the specific purpose of disseminating 
information.26 Instead, to trigger First Amendment protection, the 
 
 16.  See, e.g., Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 647–59. 
 17.  See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
 18.  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“Freedom of association therefore 
plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.”). 
 19.  AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 11 (2005) (“[A]ssorted 
speeches, essays, and ratification texts emphasizing the ‘popular rights’ that ‘the people’ ‘retain’ and 
‘reserve’ and may ‘resume’ and ‘reassume’ exemplified what the First Congress had centrally in 
mind in 1789 when it proposed certain amendments as part of a general bill of rights.”). 
 20.  This area of the law is much more well-settled.  See Farber, supra note 9, at 1486 (“[Early] 
cases provided some protection to the autonomy of the organizations as such, but more vigorously 
defended the rights of members to join associations.”). 
 21.  Id. at 1495 (“The focus in recent cases . . . is on the rights of the organization as an entity, 
not on the rights of its individual members.”). 
 22.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617–18. 
 23.  Id. at 618. 
 24.  Id. (“[Expressive association is a] right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those 
activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of 
grievances, and the exercise of religion.”). 
 25.  Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (“The First Amendment’s protection 
of expressive association is not reserved for advocacy groups.”). 
 26.  Id. at 655 (“[A]ssociations do not have to associate for the ‘purpose’ of disseminating a 
certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.  An association 
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association must center on a shared set of beliefs, ideas, or values.27  It does 
not matter whether the beliefs held relate to “political, social, economic, 
educational, religious [or] cultural ends.”28  The values or all of the specific 
beliefs held by the association, moreover, need not be held by every single 
member of the association; it is enough that the association’s leadership 
espouses a viewpoint.29 
Acknowledging the existence of an expressive association does not end 
the analysis.  The Supreme Court has declared that expressive associations 
receive First Amendment protection,30 so it follows that one must determine 
how much protection these associations should receive.  And that question is 
dependent on why we want to protect these associations in the first place. 
Much of the discussion about why associations qualify for protection 
returns to the idea of the “people” of the United States as sovereign.31  Just 
as the states have rights because they form the collective voice of the people, 
so an association has rights, reflecting that same collective voice.32  
Moreover, associations are important because they are a body unique from 
the State.  We protect expressive associations because we view as 
fundamental the right of the people to assemble free from government 
interference.33  In one view, these collective associations protect against the 
power of the State.  Freedom of expressive association “is crucial in 
preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that would rather 
express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas.”34  This is particularly true for those 
associations that express themselves inwardly, sharing and exploring beliefs 
and ideas to and among members free from public scrutiny or expression.35 
 
must merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to 
protection.”). 
 27.  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“[F]reedom to engage in 
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .”); see also Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 
650 (“It seems indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a system of values engages 
in expressive activity.”). 
 28.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (“[Expressive association may be] in pursuit of a wide variety of 
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”); see also NAACP, 357 U.S. at 
460–61. 
 29.  See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 655 (“[T]he First Amendment simply does not require that every 
member of a group agree on every issue in order for the group’s policy to be ‘expressive 
association.’”). 
 30.  See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460. 
 31.  See AMAR, supra note 19, at 11. 
 32.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010). 
 33.  See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE 
L.J. 1, 4 (1964) (“In a society governed by democratic principles it is the individual who is the 
ultimate concern of the social order.  His interests and his rights are paramount.  Association is an 
extension of individual freedom.”). 
 34.  Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 647–48. 
 35.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
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In another view, freedom of expressive association strengthens the 
individual voice by placing it into a collective.  The collective voice formed 
by an expressive association is often more powerful than an individual 
voice, warranting even greater protection.36  An expressive association takes 
the rights proffered by the First Amendment and amplifies them.37  A lone 
protester on the street might be heard by those passing by, but a hoard of 
protestors, each communicating a similar message, might be heard not only 
from a greater distance, but receive the attention of the various media 
outlets.  Thus, an expressive association may involve combined or amplified 
expression of other protected First Amendment freedoms.38 
Though expressive associations receive the full protection of the First 
Amendment, there is no absolute right to associate.39  Consequently, the 
Supreme Court has developed various tests to determine whether 
government interference in a group’s expressive association is permissible, 
and has drawn distinctions before selecting a test to apply.  Is the association 
utilizing a public forum or limited public forum?40  Is the government 
withholding a benefit or requiring action?41  Does the state regulation target 
the expressive activities of the association or is the regulation neutrally 
aimed?42  The interplay between these distinctions is murky and the doctrine 
remains nascent.43  But as we explore the murky domain, important points 
will be drawn from the cases in which the Court has applied them. 
 
 36.  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective advocacy of 
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by 
group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus 
between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”); see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622  (“According 
protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving political 
and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority.”). 
 37.  See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (“The right to associate for expressive purposes is not . . . 
absolute.”). 
 40.  See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985–86 (2010). 
 41.  See id. at 2986. 
 42.  See id. at 2991–92. 
 43.  See generally Roberts, 468 U.S. at 630–31 (holding that the state demonstrated a compelling 
interest in ending gender discrimination, and that the anti-discrimination law was narrowly tailored 
to serve that purpose); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 643 (2000) (holding that the state 
did not demonstrate a compelling interest in requiring inclusion of homosexual members into the 
local Boy Scout chapter). 
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III.  DISTINGUISHING BELIEFS 
With a broad background in place, we next address the types and 
substance of shared beliefs, and the role of these belief types in assessing the 
merit of any expressive association.  How much, if at all, should the 
substance of a group’s shared beliefs matter?  Should certain categories or 
types of beliefs disqualify a group from First Amendment status as an 
expressive association?  Should certain ways in which common beliefs or 
goals are manifested limit a group’s ability to claim protection?  The 
answers to these two distinct but often related questions are uncertain in the 
decided cases.44 
A.  Membership and Inclusion 
First, should all members of an expressive association be required to 
share in a group’s beliefs?45  And should the group’s beliefs be the sole and 
determinative criteria for membership, thus foreclosing additional 
membership restrictions like gender, race, profession, and the like?46 
In the Roberts case, the Court rejected a group’s expressive association 
claim, holding that the Jaycees’s qualifying belief—fostering success by 
young men in the free market system—was not logically related to the 
exclusion of women from the group.47  As Justice Brennan wrote for the 
Court, “[A] ‘not insubstantial part’ of the Jaycees activities constitutes 
protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs.”48 
But the Court found “no basis in the record for concluding that admission of 
women as full voting members [would] impede the organization’s ability to 
engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.”49 
A group’s beliefs and aims, in short, must somehow be related to its 
membership criteria. 
But why should this be so, especially when the membership standard is 
underinclusive, not overinclusive?  As long as the members share the 
relevant belief, the group would seem to qualify as an “expressive 
 
 44.  See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627. 
 45.  See Boy Scouts, 630 U.S. at 655–56 (stating that “the First Amendment . . . does not require 
that every member of a group agree on every issue,” and noting that it is sufficient if the group 
espouses an official position). 
 46.  See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627 (rejecting organization’s claim that “admission of women as 
full voting members [would] impede” the organization’s right to full expressive association by 
noting that such admission would “[impose] no restrictions on the organization’s ability to exclude 
individuals with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing members” (emphasis 
added)). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 626 (quoting U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1570 (8th Cir. 1983)). 
 49.  Id. at 627. 
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association” even if certain types of people—racial groups, women, 
academics, people from out of town—are excluded; for the constitutional 
value is based on a group’s function, not the particulars of its membership.50 
If the point of expressive association is to explore or pursue shared 
beliefs, an underinclusive group—in which all members share a belief but 
others, who also believe, are not admitted, such as Doctors Against Health 
Care Reform—should qualify as an expressive association, notwithstanding 
the extra-belief-based membership limit.51  At least, this is so, as long as the 
more narrowly defined group is lawful and its narrow definition does not 
undermine the group’s aims.  By similar logic, we suggest that all those 
admitted to membership must in fact share the group’s beliefs and aims, and 
do so at a level of generality commensurate with the form and function of 
the group and its governance. 
B.  Judging Beliefs 
A second way of looking at the qualifying belief question is to judge the 
beliefs themselves and permit only certain beliefs or types of belief to 
qualify a group as an expressive association.  This approach goes to the 
substance of beliefs, not simply their function in group formation and 
operation. 
One might, for example, see groups like the Jaycees or the Rotary 
Club52 as resting on beliefs or forms of belief that do not fully qualify for 
First Amendment protection.  There are two possible hurdles for groups 
pursuing belief-based qualification.  The first is that a group’s beliefs 
themselves are disqualifying.  The second is that the pursuit of the beliefs, 
which themselves qualify, is not collective, but individual, and therefore the 
“group,” nominally speaking, is not definitionally an expressive association 
because it does not employ the group in the pursuit of beliefs or action held 
in common. 
1.  Disqualifying Beliefs as Substantive Limits 
In her concurrence to the Court’s Roberts decision, Justice O’Connor 
suggested there may be substantive limits on the beliefs of an expressive 
 
 50.  See id. at 618 (defining expressive association). 
 51.  See id. 
 52.  See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
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association in order for it to qualify for First Amendment protection.53  
Specifically, she suggested that “there is only minimal constitutional 
protection of the freedom of commercial association,” a statement that 
implies substantive distinctions based on the ideas and actions of certain 
kinds of associations.54  As discussed more fully below, we believe that the 
import of her statements can best be understood to suggest something about 
the nature of the association and its activities, not the type of beliefs that 
underlie the association’s activities.55  Our view, in short, focuses more on 
the nature of the association’s function than on its substantive beliefs or 
goals.56 
But the question remains an important one:  What would be the basis for 
a substantive belief criterion for expressive associations?  What about beliefs 
and actions in pursuit of free markets, or free competition in certain 
commercial markets or industries?  Or what about beliefs tied to a specific 
product, a particular company, or a particular sales or marketing technique?  
One might say, as Justice O’Connor implied by her specific reference to 
lower protections for commercial speech, that at some point along this 
spectrum of commercial beliefs a line should be drawn.57 
But drawing that line, and then justifying its constitutional 
disqualification for an association of beliefs and expression, is a daunting 
task fraught with free speech problems.  Individuals hold an almost limitless 
variety of beliefs, and their speech stemming from or expressing those 
beliefs is, with the narrowest of exceptions, protected by the First 
Amendment.58  Expressive association is simply an instrument of the First 
Amendment by which those beliefs can be expressed or explored in common 
by a group of like-minded believers.59  To infuse it with more protection 
than the free speech principle otherwise requires would be to separate it 
from its very roots in free speech. 
Yet it is hard to imagine the expressive association First Amendment 
label being attached, for example, to Amway,60 or to an investor or 
shareholder in a company, or to the employees of a private company or a 
public agency.61  Doubtless, many Amway members believe in the 
 
 53.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 56.  See infra Part IV. 
 57.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 58.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 59.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. 
 60.  Amway is a multinational direct selling company that sells a variety of products, 
predominately in the health, beauty, and home care markets.  See Founders’ Fundamentals, AMWAY, 
http://www.amway.com/about-amway/our-company/heritage/founders-fundamentals (last visited 
Sep. 24, 2012). 
 61.  See id. (explaining that Amway “continue[s] to build on the original values and principles 
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company’s mission and purpose, and many shareholders probably believe 
fervently in the company in which they invest.  Are these beliefs to be 
discounted under the First Amendment when pursued by a group of people, 
though fully protected under the free speech guarantee?  If nothing else, the 
Citizens United62 and Sorrell63 decisions suggests that the answer is no, 
given that the corporations themselves—Amway among them—possess 
robust free speech protection.  Thus, while the first aspect—disqualifying 
beliefs—is hinted at in some of the cases, and even made explicit in others,64 
this seems wrong in the First Amendment setting, where freedom of belief 
and expression of belief are at the heart of the guarantee.65  Excluding an 
association built around belief in commerce or capitalism, for example, 
simply cannot be squared with free speech principles.66 
2.  Association, Not Expression 
But the relationship of beliefs to the association serves an alternative 
explanatory function.  This inquiry concerns the function of the nominal 
group, and disqualifies groups whose activity consists only of individual 
pursuit of beliefs or goals by way of the group but not through it; groups in 
which, instead, realization of the beliefs and goals is solely the product of 
individual action. 
There is clear evidence of this group-function view in several cases, 
especially in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in the Roberts case.67  
In her view, the common belief meriting protection was not a belief shared 
by the group as a whole, but a belief held by each individual alone, which 
the group facilitated by using the organization as a training or networking 
 
established by [its] founders,” including the values of Freedom, Family, Hope, and Reward). 
 62. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding “that the Government may not 
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity [because no] sufficient 
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations”). 
 63.  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (finding that “[s]peech in aid of 
pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment”). 
 64.  See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); Scales v. United 
States, 367 U.S. 203, 220, 228–29 (1961). 
 65.  The most famous and still dominant statement of this view was expressed by Justice Holmes 
in 1919.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 66.  See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958) (“[I]t is immaterial whether the 
beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious[,] or cultural 
matters . . . .”). 
 67.  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 639 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
BEZANSON WHITE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  12:54 PM 
 
34 
facility for each individual member.68  The Jaycees, she claimed,  
is, first and foremost, an organization that . . . promotes and 
practices the art of solicitation and management.  The organization 
claims that the training it offers its members gives them an 
advantage in business. . . .  Jaycee members hone their solicitation 
and management skill, under the direction and supervision of the 
organization, primarily through their active recruitment of new 
members.”69   
Like a group that forms momentarily simply by speaking in unison and then 
quickly dispersing, there is no reason to see the atomized function of the 
Jaycees as serving the expression or achievement of common goals by the 
group acting as one.70 
The distinction lies in the definitional nature of an association under the 
First Amendment, not in the value of a group’s common beliefs.71  Amway 
representatives, like shareholders in a corporation, may believe in the 
company at many levels, and their investment may advance the company’s 
goals—but their association with the company is atomistic, not collective. 
Like the Jaycees, as Justice O’Connor described them, shareholders may be 
like-minded, but they act as individuals pursuing their own beliefs, not those 
of others.72  Their decisions to invest or sell are not instances of collective 
action by the group. 
An expressive association under the First Amendment is a common 
enterprise consisting of expression by and for the group, not the individual 
members who can easily enough speak for themselves.  The First 
Amendment protects their association because of the strength that expression 
of a single message by a believing group speaking in concert may possess, 
or the internal belief-based satisfaction or succor that sharing beliefs within a 
group may yield.73  Amway representatives, in contrast, seek to advance 
their own, often common, beliefs and interests through the group, but they 
are not interested in the group’s expressive action unless it serves their own 
financial interests.  They are like football players on a ranked college team: 
dependent on each other and on the cohesiveness of the group in athletic 
competition, but ultimately concerned about their own success through the 
team.  Shareholders, no matter how fervent, are similarly interested in their 
own economic return, at least within public companies.  Nonprofit and 
 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See id. 
 71.  See id. at 622 (majority opinion). 
 72.  See id. at 639 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 73.  Id. at 618–19 (majority opinion). 
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charitable corporations or groups are typically different, as the opportunity 
for the pursuit of wholly individual and atomistic goals, at least in the sense 
of shareholder profit, is largely foreclosed. 
The distinction, then, is not the beliefs unifying the individuals but the 
nature of the association.  It rests upon the means by which belief is 
advanced and, most basically, upon the individual group members’ 
relationship to the group.  Protected associations speak as a group for the 
group.  Whether the group is spiritual, ideological, or commercial makes no 
difference.  It is the group’s expressive activities that are protected, and the 
individual’s part must be subordinated to the collective action and pursuit of 
beliefs by the group.  This, we think, is the better and sounder way to 
understand the Roberts and Rotary Club cases. 
Some have seen these cases as reflecting a distinction between 
philosophy, ideology, and social action, on the one hand, and commerce and 
business on the other.74  Such a distinction would be very hard to manage in 
the expressive association setting, and, in any event, the underlying 
distinction between commercial speech and fully protected speech is quickly 
breaking down in the Supreme Court’s free speech jurisprudence.75  It is 
much easier, and much more consistent with the collective expressive action 
premise of the expressive association concept, to rest the distinction on a 
clear requirement that the association, to qualify, must engage in expression 
or action collectively and not simply through the individual action of its 
members.76 
IV.  THE FUNCTIONAL TYPOLOGIES OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION 
At the heart of the expressive association map are the various functional 
typologies.  As we dissect both the types of associations and the types of 
expression, patterns begin to emerge.  As a starting point, expression may be 
 
 74.  See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 9, a 1517 (2001) (“Justice O’Connor’s analysis distinguishes 
predominantly commercial associations, which do not enjoy full associational protection, from 
expressive associations, which do.”). 
 75.  See Donald L. Beschle, Clearly Canadian?  Hill v. Colorado and Free Speech Balancing in 
the United States and Canada, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187, 231 (2001) (noting that, in the United 
States free speech context, “the walls of previously defined categories are breaking down, or being 
stretched,” and recognizing that “[p]reviously unprotected categories of speech [like commercial 
speech] are now given some degree of protection”). 
 76.  See David P. Gearey, New Protections After Boy Scouts of America v. Dale: A Private 
University’s First Amendment Right to Pursue Diversity, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583, 1600 (2004) 
(collective action is a requirement for expressive association). 
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directed inward and meant only to be shared by those within the group.77  
Expression may also be projected outward to the public.78  Additionally, 
associations may be classified as either heterogeneous or homogeneous in 
composition—this heterogeneity may be reflected in both purpose and 
form.79  Finally, groups may be classified according to their structure, or 
lack thereof.80  Closely related to this question of form is the cohesiveness of 
the message that the group projects.81  The sections that follow deal with 
these questions of classification.  The ideas and typologies suggested are by 
no means exhaustive, but provide an important starting point for truly 
tackling the questions of what is an expressive association and what are its 
constitutional boundaries. 
A.  Inward and Outward Expression 
We turn now to our first functional typology—inward-oriented 
expressive activities and outward-oriented action in the form of speech or 
other expressive activities.  Some associations may be defined solely by 
their inward-facing expression.  For instance, associations may center 
themselves around prayer, group counseling, team-building exercises, or 
other self-supporting activities.82  In contrast, other groups engage almost 
exclusively in outward expression, invoking activism over silence—a protest 
on the capitol steps, a direct-mail campaign, or a series of television 
advertisements.83  Yet other groups lie somewhere in between—neither 
wholly inward, nor wholly outward, but opting instead for some 
combination of the two.84 
Thus, this functional typology looks not to the who of the group, but to 
the how.  In other words, the inward-outward distinction reflects how a 
group expresses itself as opposed to who makes up the association.85  
Foremost, the distinction analyzes how a group conveys its message—or 
messages—and to whom.  How a group expresses itself may dictate the 
justification for and the level of First Amendment protection granted to the 
association.86 
 
 77.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 78.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 79.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 80.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 81.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 82.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 83.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 84.  See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 85.  Later typologies will explore the intricacies of group membership, but for now we focus on 
the types of expression an association centers itself around. 
 86.  Identifying the specific level of protection that a court should apply to an inward versus 
outward group is beyond the scope of this article.  Nonetheless, by flushing out the distinctions 
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For outward expressive groups and activities, First Amendment claims 
will primarily track conventional free speech interests, including access to 
fora for speech as well as freedom from impermissible discrimination based 
on content.87  In contrast, the interests of inward expressive associations will 
reflect the greater importance for their activities of access to places and use 
of public property, confidentiality and privacy for individual members and 
the collective organization, and freedom in defining goals and the terms of 
membership or participation.88 
For each association, then, we can ask whether the expression turns 
inward or outward or both.  Through a study of existing associations, we can 
also see the distinction in action, thus providing meaningful insight into the 
murky definition of expressive association. 
1.  Inward Expression 
Inward expressive activity is characterized by its boundary within the 
group.  Group members channel expression within the confines of the 
association and for the benefit of the group alone.  In such instances, 
associations are not trying to enact political change, recruit new members, or 
disperse a message outside of the bounds of the group.  Instead, where the 
expression is inward, the association exists for the benefit of the association 
itself.89  Whether to support its members, spur intellectual curiosity, or 
continue long-lasting traditions, inward expression serves to strengthen 
associations, while espousing ambivalence towards those outside of the 
group.  This type of expression can take many forms. 
a.  Counsel and Support 
Some associations may exist for and express themselves through 
counseling and support services.  Members, often sharing common struggles 
 
between these types of groups, the First Amendment values worthy of protection become much 
clearer. 
 87.  See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984–86 (2010) (applying public forum analysis to the Christian Legal 
Society’s expressive association claim). 
 88.  See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–63 (1958). 
 89.  This is not to say that once a group exercises inward expression it ceases to exist for the 
benefit of outsiders.  As discussed at the beginning of this section, many groups are neither wholly 
inward nor wholly outward.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.A.3.  
Thus, where a group falls somewhere between the ends of the spectrum, only its inward expression 
is solely for the benefit of the group. 
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or pain, share those experiences with one another in a safe and comforting 
environment.  For instance, Alcoholics Anonymous—an organization for 
recovering alcoholics—describes itself as a “fellowship of men and women 
who share their experience, strength and hope with each other that they may 
solve their common problem and help others to recover from alcoholism.”90  
Further, Alcoholics Anonymous prides itself on its inner-organizational 
focus and disclaims outward allegiances.91  As its informational statement 
describes, “AA is not allied with any sect, denomination, politics, 
organization or institution; does not wish to engage in any controversy, 
neither endorses nor opposes any causes.”92  This policy statement makes 
clear that Alcoholics Anonymous exists solely for the benefit of its 
members, expressing itself inwardly through counseling and recovery 
services.93 
b.  Ritual and Secrecy 
For other groups, inward expression is defined not just by its boundary 
within the group, but also by its exclusivity.  For these groups, certain 
information and knowledge is available only to those within the group and 
otherwise kept strictly confidential.  One such group cloaked in secrecy is 
the Skull and Bones—a society for select undergraduate seniors at Yale 
University.94  Little is known about this student organization, but much 
speculation surrounds its secret rituals and prominent list of members.95  As 
another example, Scientologists require membership—and a series of 
donations—as a prerequisite to learning about and experiencing many of the 
group’s religious and philosophical beliefs.96  These groups not only direct 
their expression inward, but they also seek to prevent outsiders from having 
access to this expression. 
 
 90. Information on A.A., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, http://www.aa.org/subpage.cfm?page=1 
(last visited Sep. 25, 2012). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Judith Ann Schiff, How the Secret Societies Got that Way, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Sep.–Oct. 
2004, http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/2004_09/old_yale.html. 
 95.  Id.; see also Molly Ball & Emily Bell, Behind the Walls of Yale’s Secret Societies, YALE 
HERALD ONLINE, http://www.yaleherald.com/archive/frosh/1998/blue/secret.html (last visited Sep. 
25, 2012). 
 96.  See Richard Behar, The Thriving Cult of Greed and Power, TIME, May 6, 1991, at 50 
(“Today the church invents costly new services with all the zeal of its founder.  Scientology doctrine 
warns that even adherents who are ‘cleared’ of engrams face grave spiritual dangers unless they are 
pushed to higher and more expensive levels.”). 
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c.  Study and Intellectual Growth 
Yet other groups express themselves inwardly to foster intellectual 
discussion and advance their respective studies.  For instance, Mensa prides 
itself on only admitting members whose “IQ is in the top 2% of the 
population.”97  One of its primary goals is to “promote stimulating 
intellectual and social opportunities for its members.”98  Like Alcoholics 
Anonymous, Mensa seeks to disassociate itself from beliefs outside of its 
primary aim, disclaiming any purpose beyond the fostering of intelligence 
by taking “no stand on politics, religion or social issues.”99 
d.  Bonding and Training 
Finally, many associations form so that members can bond together 
through a common mentoring, educational, or training goal.  These groups 
include such organizations as the Girl Scouts,100 4-H clubs,101 and the 
National FFA Organization.102  The Boy Scouts of America also fit this 
form—bonding together and educating young men.103  The Boy Scouts 
mission is to “provide[] a program for young people that builds character, 
trains them in the responsibilities of participating citizenship, and develops 
personal fitness.”104  The Boy Scouts rally around certain values known as 
“Scout Law.”105  Indeed, all scouts aspire to be trustworthy, loyal, helpful, 
friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and 
 
 97.  About Mensa International, MENSA INT’L,  http://www.mensa.org/about-us (last visited Sep. 
25, 2012). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See Who We Are: Facts, GIRL SCOUTS, http://www.girlscouts.org/who_we_are/facts/ (last 
visited Sep. 25, 2012) (“Girl Scouting builds girls of courage, confidence, and character, who make 
the world a better place.”). 
 101.  See Who We Are, 4-H, http://www.4-h.org/about/youth-development-organization/ (last 
visited Sep. 25, 2012) (“[T]he 4-H movement supports young people from elementary school 
through high school with programs designed to shape future leaders and innovators.”). 
 102.  See Who We Are: Mission and Motto, NAT’L FFA ORG., https://www.ffa.org/about/ 
whoweare/Pages/MissionandMotto.aspx (last visited Sep. 25, 2012) (“The National FFA 
Organization is dedicated to making a  positive difference in the lives of students by developing their 
potential for premier leadership, personal growth and career success through agricultural 
education.”). 
 103.  See About the BSA, BOY SCOUTS OF AM., http://www.scouting.org/About.aspx (last visited 
Sep. 25, 2012). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Visitor: What Are the Scout Oath and Scout Law?, BOY SCOUTS OF AM., 
http://www.scouting.org/FAQ/Visitor.aspx (last visited Sep. 25, 2012). 
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reverent.106 
The Supreme Court addressed the nature of the Boy Scouts expression 
in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.107  In Dale, the Court considered whether 
the inclusion of an “unwanted member”—in this instance, a homosexual 
scoutmaster—impermissibly “infringe[d] the group’s freedom of expressive 
association . . . [by affecting] in a significant way the group’s ability to 
advocate public or private viewpoints.”108  The Court found that the general 
mission of the Boy Scouts was to instill values in its young members, and 
accepted the Boy Scouts’s assertion that homosexuality was at odds with the 
Scout Oath and Law, which sets forth those general value principles.109  
Deferring to the association’s view of what would “impair its expression,” 
the Court held that the forced inclusion of a homosexual scoutmaster would 
impermissibly interfere with the Boy Scouts’s right to expressive 
association.110  The Court provided this protection to the Boy Scouts despite 
the fact that it did not “associate for the purpose of disseminating the belief 
that homosexuality is immoral.”111  Indeed, the Court seemed to 
acknowledge and protect the inward-oriented nature of the Boy Scouts, 
holding that “associations do not have to associate for the ‘purpose’ of 
disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of 
the First Amendment.  An association must merely engage in expressive 
activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection.”112 
2.  Outward Expression 
At the other end of the expressive association spectrum are groups 
exhibiting outward expression.  Quite the opposite of inward expression, 
outward expression goes well beyond the boundaries of the association 
itself.  Groups wishing to express themselves outwardly must reach out to 
nonmembers in a notable way.  This outreach can take many forms. 
a.  Charitable 
Some groups—most obviously nonprofit organizations—organize 
themselves around charitable pursuits.  These associations seek to help those 
 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 108.  Id. at 648 (citation omitted). 
 109.  Id. at 650. 
 110.  Id. at 653 (“As we give deference to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its 
expression, we must also give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its 
expression.”). 
 111.  Id. at 654 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 112.  Id. at 655. 
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outside of the group through philanthropic endeavors.  Included in this form 
are the Knights of Columbus—a male-only Catholic organization dedicated 
to charity.113  The Knights of Columbus’s “charitable activities encompass 
an almost infinite variety of local, national and international projects.”114  
Another example includes the United Way, which seeks to “advance the 
common good and mobilize the caring power of communities around the 
world” by “ignit[ing] a worldwide social movement, and thereby 
mobiliz[ing] millions to action—to give, advocate and volunteer to improve 
the conditions in which they live.”115  Charitable associations such as these 
express themselves outwardly through service to others. 
b.  Political 
Political groups represent another outward-oriented paradigm.  Obvious 
examples include political parties, but this classification also covers smaller, 
activist-based groups.  For instance the Federalist Society, “a group of 
conservatives and libertarians interested in the current state of the legal 
order,” organizes around a shared belief that the judiciary should take a 
textually and historically limiting approach to interpreting laws and the 
Constitution, and “seeks both to promote an awareness of these principles 
and to further their application through its activities.”116  Another example 
includes Students for a Democratic Society, which describes itself as “a 
radical, multi-issue student and youth organization working to build power 
in our schools and communities.”117  Political groups exist to advocate 
beliefs to the public, and so could not exist without an outlet for outward 
expression. 
c.  Issue-Based 
Sharing many similarities and often overlapping with political groups, 
 
 113.  See Activities, KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS, http://www.kofc.org/un/en/about/activities/ 
index.html (last visited Sep. 25, 2012) (“From the moment of our founding in 1882, charity has been 
the first principle of the Knights of Columbus.  We are men of faith and men of action.”). 
 114.  Id. 
 115. About United Way Worldwide, UNITED WAY, http://www.unitedway.org/pages/about-united-
way-worldwide/ (last visited Sep. 25, 2012). 
 116.  About Us, THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR LAW AND PUB. POLICY STUDIES,  http://www.fed-
soc.org/aboutus/ (last visited Sep. 25, 2012). 
 117.  About Us, STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOC’Y,  http://www.newsds.org/about-us (last 
visited Sep. 25, 2012).  In Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 171–80 (1972), the Supreme Court 
addressed Students for a Democratic Society and its role as an expressive association. 
BEZANSON WHITE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  12:54 PM 
 
42 
issue-based groups organize around a single issue and advocate on behalf of 
that issue.  For instance, the National Rifle Association seeks to preserve the 
Second Amendment and individual gun ownership rights.118  It describes its 
four million members as “among history’s most committed, most active and 
most politically savvy defenders of the fundamental freedom.”119  Another 
issue-based group is the NAACP—a group dedicated to preserving and 
enhancing the civil rights of Americans.120  These issue-based groups strive 
to raise awareness of their central issues and to convince outsiders to adhere 
to the group’s message. 
3.  Falling Along the Spectrum: A Case Study in Religious 
Organizations 
As noted above, few groups can be classified as wholly outward or 
wholly inward.121  Even those groups nearing one end of the spectrum may, 
at times, engage in group activity outside of their norms.  Thus, it is more 
important to classify the type of expression than the type of group.  In other 
words, a group’s inward expression raises different constitutional questions 
than a group’s outward expression.  An apt illustration of this arises when 
analyzing religious groups.  For instance, a self-identified Baptist engages in 
different expression within the confines of a Bible study than if she hands 
out Bibles on the street corner.122 
Moreover, not only might the expression be different, but the 
constitutional provisions triggered will often be different—namely, freedom 
of speech or the Free Exercise Clause.123  For instance, few would question 
 
 118. See Wayne LaPierre, LaPierre: NRA Has Never Backed Down, HUMAN EVENTS (Feb. 14, 
2012, 7:45 AM) http:///www.humanevents.com/2012/02/14/lapierre-nra-has-never-backed-down/ 
1345271130000/. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See Welcome to the NAACP, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/ (last visited Sep. 25, 2012) 
(“[T]he NAACP is the nation’s oldest and largest civil rights organization.  From the ballot box to 
the classroom, the thousands of dedicated workers, organizers, leaders and members who make up 
the NAACP continue to fight for social justice for all Americans.”). 
  The NAACP triggered the Court’s expressive association jurisprudence.  In NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958), the Supreme Court upheld the right of the 
NAACP to not reveal the names and addresses of its members to the states, holding that such a 
revelation would violate the group’s expressive association rights, curtailing the group’s ability to 
advocate its beliefs. 
 121.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 122.  Though the case did not dive into the religion clauses, the Westboro Baptist Church 
described in Snyder v. Phelps provides an example of the types of outward expression associated 
with a religion-centered expressive association.  Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011) 
(“The church frequently communicates its views by picketing, often at military funerals.  In the more 
than 20 years that the members of Westboro Baptist have publicized their message, they have 
picketed nearly 600 funerals.”). 
 123.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
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that the Free Exercise Clause protects the right of evangelicals to join 
together in a morning church service, espousing whatever beliefs they 
choose and excluding whomever they choose.  However, whether the Free 
Exercise Clause protects the right of evangelical students to exclude 
members from their public-funded student organization is a much murkier 
question and perhaps one better dealt with in the expressive association 
context.124  This switch from an evangelical in a church to an evangelical in 
a student organization also reflects a shift in expression.  The closely knit 
community of a church calls for much inward expression, while a student 
organization incorporates outward expression. 
An example is provided by the Christian Legal Society (CLS), a 
religious-academic student organization.125  The Supreme Court specifically 
dealt with the nature of its expression in Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez.126 CLS is a national religious organization centered around 
Christian beliefs which describes its mission as follows: 
(1) to build communities of Christian law students who glorify God 
in their lives, their schools, and their profession, and (2) to nurture 
and encourage Christian law students by providing mentors and 
resources aimed at fostering spiritual growth, compassionate 
outreach, and the integration of faith and practice.127 
Additionally, CLS requires all members, as a condition of membership, 
to sign a “Statement of Faith.”128  Most controversial for purposes of the 
case, CLS interpreted the Statement of Faith to mean that “unrepentant 
participation in or advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle is inconsistent 
with an affirmation of the Statement of Faith, and consequently may be 
regarded by CLS as disqualifying such an individual from CLS 
 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).  See generally Scott M. Noveck, The 
Promise and Problems of Treating Religious Freedom as Freedom of Association, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 
75 (providing in depth discussion of merits of analyzing religion under the free exercise clause 
versus as an expressive association). 
 124.  See generally Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law 
v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 125.  See About Us, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/page.aspx?pid=327 (last 
visited Sep. 25, 2012) [hereinafter About CLS]. 
 126.  130 S. Ct. 2971. 
 127. What is Christian Legal Society?  Law Student Ministries, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, 
http://www.clsnet.org/pages/law-students/chapter-manual-what-is-cls? (last visited Sep. 25, 2012). 
 128.  Statement of Faith, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/page.aspx?pid=367 
(last visited Sep. 25, 2012). 
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membership.”129  Sexually immoral conduct was defined to “include[] 
engaging in ‘acts of sexual conduct outside of God’s design for marriage 
between one man and one woman[,]’” which acts include fornication, 
adultery, and homosexual conduct.130  Thus, by choosing not to associate 
with those unwilling to sign the Statement of Faith, CLS ran afoul of the law 
school’s nondiscrimination policy.131 
The case pitted a religious-student organization—claiming the right to 
associate only with members who ascribe to its principles of faith—against a 
law school, claiming the right to cut off funding to any student group whose 
membership excluded others based on “status or belief.”132  The case called 
upon the Court to weigh CLS’s right to associate with members of its own 
choosing, CLS’s evangelizing in the law school environment, and the law 
school’s interest in maintaining an academic environment that was inclusive 
of all students.133 
Unlike individuals attending a church service or Bible study, members 
of CLS consist of law students who affiliate with the group as an extension 
of their academic study.134  The association’s expression is not wholly 
inward—as an intimate church service may be—but, instead, involves 
spreading a message and interacting with those outside of the group.135  
CLS, then, as a religious-academic organization, is clearly an expressive 
association, but less clearly a group demanding the protections of the Free 
Exercise Clause.  Therefore, where religious groups, such as CLS or the 
Knights of Columbus, express themselves outwardly, protections may be 
better analyzed under the right to expressive association than the Free 
Exercise Clause.136  If instead, CLS were a private religious organization 
communicating mostly within the confines of the group, the Free Exercise 
Clause provides a more exacting fit.137  The Supreme Court seemed to agree, 
analyzing only CLS’s expressive association claims rather than free exercise 
 
 129.  Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 3001. 
 130.  Id. (quoting Running a Student Chapter: CLS Community Life Statement, CHRISTIAN LEGAL 
SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/pages/law-students/chapter-manual-running-a-chapter? (last visited 
Sep. 25, 2012)). 
 131.  Id. at 2980. 
 132.  Id. at 2979. 
 133.  Id. at 2978. 
 134.  See, Running a Student Chapter, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/pages/ 
law-students/chapter-manual-running-a-chapter? (last visited Sep. 25, 2012). 
 135.  For instance, CLS prides itself on its legal aid clinics. Legal Aid Ministries, CHRISTIAN 
LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/page.aspx?pid=429 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (“Since 2000, 
thousands of CLS members have donated hundreds of thousands of legal service hours to helping the 
disadvantaged untangle debilitating legal issues, seek Christian guidance for personal problems, and 
understand their rights under the law so they can lead more productive lives.”). 
 136.  Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2975. 
 137.  See id. at 2979. 
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claims.138 
Beyond the threshold question of which guarantee—freedom of religion 
or freedom of speech—dominates the analysis, expressive associational 
principles may also shape the constitutional protection to applicable First 
Amendment values.  Inward expression serves different values and ends than 
outward expression, which is more dominantly mechanical and focused on 
amplification of individuals’ speech.139  Between these two types, the 
strength of scrutiny may appropriately be distinct.  It is not our purpose to 
develop those differences, but the structure we provide here is a starting 
point. 
B.  Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Associations 
Beyond classifying the nature of a group’s expression, expressive 
associations may also be classified according to the conformity of the 
group’s composition and purpose—whether it be homogeneous or 
heterogeneous.  The classic form of expressive association recognized by the 
Supreme Court consists of a homogeneous and largely single purpose group 
like the NAACP or the Sons of Liberty.140  But the composition of many 
expressive associations is more complex than these, and one of the axes of 
complexity concerns the heterogeneity that a qualifying group might 
contain.  There are two types of heterogeneity that concern us in this Part: 
heterogeneity in composition and purpose and heterogeneity in the form of 
the group.  Both attributes, as we will see, are best understood as intimately 
connected.141  We will later deal separately with heterogeneity in the 
organizational composition of membership, which we will call the 
conglomerate question.142 
1.  Beliefs and Aims 
In this part we focus on the glue—beliefs and common interests—that 
 
 138.  CLS argued that the law school’s nondiscrimination policy violated both their free exercise 
rights and their right to an expressive association.  Id. at 2979.  In the end, the Court upheld the law 
school’s nondiscrimination policy through a novel application of forum analysis to its expressive 
association jurisprudence, holding that the law school’s policy was viewpoint neutral and a 
reasonable regulation.  Id. at 2993–94. 
 139.  See supra Part IV.A.1–2. 
 140.  An instructive history and discussion can be found in Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876, 925–26 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 141.  See infra Part IV.B.3.a–b. 
 142.  See infra Part IV.C.2.c. 
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binds the group.  As a general matter, we are not concerned with diversity of 
membership, as such, or even different views and attitudes on matters of 
politics, socioeconomic status, or the like.  These are simply different 
backgrounds against which common affiliations typically exist.  Instead we 
are concerned with the relationship between a group’s common aims or 
beliefs and the affiliation of members, otherwise diverse or not, in the group.  
Without some common core of aims or beliefs, the very idea of expressive 
association would be meaningless.143 
Common aims or beliefs must therefore be ascertainable as a 
definitional prerequisite to protection under the First Amendment.144  Those 
aims and beliefs must be ascertainable at some level of concreteness, and 
adherence to them by the group must be governable and governed within the 
group.145  If there is no governing control of the common purposes to be 
pursued by the group, there is no reason to treat the collection of individuals 
or members as an expressive association.146  For example, if a group focused 
on economic issues takes a position on a matter of religion unrelated to the 
group’s economic aims, then the high degree of heterogeneity in the 
common aims and purposes of the group should disqualify its action as an 
instance of expressive association, and may even lead to the conclusion that 
the group’s governance toward its aims has been fatally undermined by the 
unilateral action in the face of the group’s expressive aims. 
But group aims and purposes may be broad and quite diverse, within 
limits.  The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), for example, has a 
stated commitment to expression and action in defense of civil rights.147  
Such a broad set of common aims and purposes can involve many specific 
actions and policy positions with which the members of the group disagree, 
perhaps strenuously.148  Whether such disagreement is disqualifying is a 
function of the breadth and heterogeneity of the aims and purposes 
themselves.  It is also a function of the range of actions the group has 
delegated to the governing authority in the group.  The League of Women 
Voters has general aims as a national organization, but members of the 
group also subscribe to a governance structure under which many of its 
constituent chapters reach their own policy positions, and individual 
 
 143.  See supra note 24–29 and accompanying text (defining the concept of expressive 
association). 
 144.  See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621–22 (1984). 
 145.  See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653–56 (2000). 
 146.  See supra note 24–29 and accompanying text. 
 147.  See About the ACLU, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/about-aclu-0 (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) 
(stating the broad panoply of rights the ACLU seeks to protect, including First Amendment rights, 
equal protection rights, due process rights, and privacy rights). 
 148.  E.g., John de J. Pemberton, Jr., Letter to the Editor, Dissension in the ACLU, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, Sep. 14, 1967, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1967/sep/14/dissension-in-the-
aclu/. 
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members do not condition their affiliation on specific personal agreement 
with any particular decision made as long as it is pursuant to processes of 
judgment and decision to which a member must knowingly subscribe.149  
Thus, the First Amendment may protect these diverse groups’ right of 
expressive association so long as a diverse array of purposes is made a 
hallmark of the organization and such purposes are defined.  These 
heterogeneous groups touch on more traditional First Amendment interests 
of speech and the members use the group as a means to amplify their 
message. 
2.  Form and Structure of Groups 
The heterogeneity inquiry thus inevitably must focus heavily on the 
form of the group, not just any single instance of collective action.  Whether 
a band of people who casually congregate in common cause, only to disband 
after a brief moment in time, constitutes an expressive association for 
purposes of the First Amendment, as opposed to a set of individual speakers 
with a very specific and momentary agreement, is an open question.  But it 
does seem clear that something more formal and lasting (even briefly) goes 
to the heart of the constitutional values that underlie the First Amendment 
expressive association label.150  Momentary agreement, like singing in 
unison, should be seen as the speech of each individual singer, with respect 
to which the First Amendment provides full and ample protection.  
Something more lasting, however, may trigger other protections such as the 
right to association. 
It is thus on questions not only of substance of belief but also of non-
transitory form of a group or association that we will focus in our discussion 
of heterogeneity and expressive association.  Form, as we will use the term, 
includes not just the composition of the membership of a group, but more 
importantly whether the group has a formal, recognized identity, a 
governance structure, and a set of aims and purposes to which the individual 
members subscribe—or, at least, consent—and a duration.  Furthermore, we 
will ask whether the aims and purposes represent a common core of 
individual member belief or commitment, and whether and how the 
members themselves participate in a governance fashion with those who 
govern the group, at least to a sufficient degree such that the group’s 
 
 149.  See About the League, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, http://www.lwv.org/content/about-us 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2012). 
 150.  Cf. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621–22 (1984). 
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collective actions can be said to reflect the aims and purposes of the 
individual members, who are the First Amendment speakers in fact.  As the 
question might be put in corporate terms: is there a clear separation between 
ownership and management, and what sorts of duties of allegiance to the 
common aims and purposes of the members or owners does the management 
have? 
As an extension of the heterogeneity question we will look to the formal 
nature of the group.  Is its expressive activity inward-directed only, or 
outward-oriented, as with public speech?  It is likely, perhaps, that the 
heterogeneity of beliefs and aims regarding those beliefs will be greater with 
inward-directed groups, which might assemble, as did the famous 
Metaphysical Club,151 in order to discuss, study, or explore a broad or 
limitless set of beliefs or ideas. In contrast, an outward-oriented group 
engaged purposely in expressing views outside its membership would seem 
ill-suited under the Supreme Court’s rationale for expressive association 
protection if its aims were intellectually global and its positions wholly 
undetermined. 
3.  Business Corporations as Expressive Associations 
As an illustration of the heterogeneity question, we turn to the Supreme 
Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
holding that, at least with respect to political speech, corporations qualify as 
fully protected speakers under the First Amendment.152  In the words of the 
Court:  
[P]olitical speech does not lose First Amendment protection 
“simply because its source is a corporation. . . .”  The Court has thus 
rejected the argument that political speech of a corporation or other 
associations should be treated differently under the First 
Amendment simply because such associations are not “natural 
persons.”153  
And, the Court adds, a corporation’s speech is protected by the First 
Amendment “even if it was enabled by economic transactions with persons 
or entities who disagree with the [corporation’s] ideas.”154  That is, it does 
not matter for First Amendment purposes that the shareholders and 
investors, for example, disagree with the corporation’s speech.155  While 
 
 151.  See generally Louis Menand, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2002). 
 152.  130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). 
 153.  Id. at 900 (quoting First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783, 784 (1978)). 
 154.  Id. at 905. 
 155.  See id. 
BEZANSON WHITE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  12:54 PM 
[Vol. 40: 23, 2012] Forms of Expressive Association 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
49 
Citizens United deals only, at least explicitly, with the speech questions, it 
may have far-reaching implications for the rights of expressive associations. 
In light of Citizens United, how are corporations to be treated in the 
expressive association context?  Corporations are now fully protected 
speakers equivalent in First Amendment rights to individuals, at least with 
respect to political speech.156  But they are also organizations consisting of 
members.  The NAACP, the Boy Scouts, and religious groups, to name but a 
few, have speech rights, but they are also protected expressive 
associations.157  Many, like the ACLU, have corporate members and receive 
significant corporate support.158  The protection such associations enjoy 
serves their members’ expressive freedom and the organizations’ capacity to 
act on it through speech by the organization.  The fact that under Citizens 
United corporations are themselves, as organizations, speakers, even in the 
absence of agreement by shareholders or members, does not itself foreclose 
the corporation also being protected as an expressive association. 
Nonetheless, the right to speak and the right to expressive association 
are two distinct issues.159  Being an entity with freedom to speak does not in 
itself mean that the entity is an expressive association.160  The Court has held 
that the Jaycees and Rotary Club do not enjoy the freedom granted 
qualifying expressive associations.161  Something else pertaining to beliefs, 
qualifications for membership, and the types of expressive commitments or 
activities, whether kept within the group or channeled outward, is needed to 
qualify an association as an expressive association speaking or existing on 
behalf of the members’ own expressive interests.162 
Has Citizens United changed all of that?  To explore this question we 
must first consider the various forms of corporation or group enterprise and 
the distinct purposes and functions they serve—in other words, the 
heterogeneity of corporations.  Citizens United was an ideological corporate 
organization dedicated to speaking on behalf of known political interests and 
 
 156.  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
 157.  Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 
130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648–53 (2000); NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–63 (1958). 
 158.  See, e.g., Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. 640; NAACP, 357 U.S. 449; see also David E. Bernstein, 
Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 MO. L. REV. 83, 90 (2001). 
 159.  Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913, with Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 648–53. 
 160.  Cf. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
 161.  Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 162.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622–23; Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 545–48. 
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beliefs.163  But this is far from true with most corporations and their 
organizational kin. 
There are many forms of corporation: profit; nonprofit; charitable; 
Subchapter-S; joint ventures; as well as other non-corporate organizations 
that share the qualities of corporations: limited partnerships; partnerships; 
alliances of various kinds; etc.164  Of equal importance, there are many types 
of corporations in terms of their objects, missions, and activities: charitable; 
religious; and social service.165  And of course there are the dominant special 
purpose corporations that we call “business corporations.”166 
It is to the business corporations that Citizens United was addressed,167 
and we will principally focus on how these corporations act as expressive 
associtations, specifically, their activities and policies, and their members’ 
rights of affiliation and association within the organization.  Business 
corporations and organizations are entities whose primary activity is to 
conduct business—selling, serving, buying, transacting—for the overriding 
purpose of making profit and maximizing economic value and return to 
shareholders.168  Of equal importance, they are also organizations marked by 
a formal legal separation between management and ownership, a feature that 
is most pronounced with publicly held corporations.169 
Most business corporations have protection under the First Amendment 
for the necessary business speech in which they engage—like advertising, 
defending their commercial interests in the marketplace, and the like.170  
Their protection under the First Amendment, according to the Supreme 
Court, is for “commercial speech.”171  Two things are important to note in 
relation to commercial speech.  First, the protection is accorded to the 
speech—or commercial information communicated—not to the act of 
 
 163.  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886–87. 
 164.  See Romualdo P. Eclavea, Joint Venture Distinguished From Other Relationships, in 46 AM. 
JUR. 2d Joint Ventures § 5 (2012). 
 165.  See WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, Classifications and Kinds of Corporations: Charitable and 
Benevolent Corporations, in 1A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS. § 79 
(2012). 
 166.  See Eclavea, supra note 164. 
 167.  Ironically, however, Citizens United was clearly an ideological and belief-based corporation 
whose mission was to engage in public communication.  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 922–24.  The 
Court, however, treated this fact as irrelevant—indeed essentially rejected its significance—by 
rejecting the government’s argument that was very much premised on this fact.  Id. 
 168.  See Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primary, 31 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 533 (2006). 
 169.  ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 6 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968). 
 170.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 759–
61 (1976). 
 171. Id. at 758–61. 
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speaking as such, whether by an ad agency or the corporation itself.172  
Second, the First Amendment primarily protects the public as consumers for 
whom the information is valuable in a market economy.173  In these respects, 
the kind of First Amendment protection against government regulation of 
commercial speech is (1) weaker than that accorded speech by an individual, 
(2) qualified in part by the acknowledged ability of government to regulate 
such speech to assure that it is accurate and non-deceptive, and (3) leaves 
government more room for regulatory decisions than would be available for 
regulation of individual speech under the strict scrutiny test.174 
Reasonableness is instead the standard.175 
Outside of the commercial speech arena, business corporation speech 
receives much the same protection as individual speech, at least with respect 
to political speech.176  The political speech boundary is very ambiguous.  
The Court in Citizens United addressed only business corporation support of 
and engagement in independent expenditures related to political campaigns, 
but it used the political speech descriptor in stating its broad holding.177  As a 
result, and if prior experience with political or public issue boundaries in 
other First Amendment settings is any indication,178 the political speech 
boundary of Citizens United will be greatly broadened in future cases, and 
the Court may well ultimately conclude that all non-commercial speech by 
corporations is fully protected. 
This is the landscape against which the business-corporation-as-
expressive-association issue exists.  Our first question is what effect Citizens 
United will have on corporate shareholders’ claims that they are an 
expressive association even though their speech is animated by commercial 
purposes.  We can identify three principal effects of such a claim of 
expressive association status, if successful: 
1.  The Jaycees179 and Rotary180 cases, which rested on the less 
 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at 756–57. 
 174.  Cecil C. Kuhne, Testing the Outer Limits of Commercial Speech: Its First Amendment 
Implications, 23 REV. LITIG. 607, 613–14 (2004). 
 175.  Ann K. Wooster, Protection of Commercial Speech Under the First Amendment—Supreme 
Court Cases, in 164 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2000). 
 176.  Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 951 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 177.  Id. at 900 (majority opinion). 
 178.  E.g., Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 343–44 (1974) (abandoning as ungovernable the earlier 
matter of public concern standard). 
 179.  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
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valuable nature of personal business interests to deny protection,181 
will be undermined.  Business entities should now be eligible for 
protection as First Amendment expressive associations whose 
speech is, at least on political matters related to business interests, 
fully protected, and whose membership and other practices, 
including nondisclosure, might be protected from state regulation 
under the First Amendment. 
2.  Government regulations of business membership practices 
should be subjected to strict scrutiny.  These regulations might 
include anti-discrimination laws as well as expression-related 
restrictions by the SEC, or EPA, or product safety agencies, and so 
on. 
3.  Membership and other disclosure requirements (political 
contributions and expenditures) will be subject to strict scrutiny if 
the organization or its members assert that their membership 
(including stock purchase) would be inhibited by the prospect of 
lost privacy in political, social, and economic beliefs and 
affiliations.182 
Whether business corporations qualify as expressive associations after 
Citizens United, however, is a distinct question from whether such 
corporations themselves, independent of the members, have free speech 
rights. 
Expressive association law under the First Amendment has been 
premised from the start on the protection of certain types of associations and 
on certain subjects, in order that disclosure not inhibit the members of 
associations from engaging in group formation in areas important to 
individual liberty—like religion, politics, and ideology, and social, 
economic, and cultural beliefs and interests—nor inhibit the associations’ 
expression on behalf of the members.183  Such group formations foster 
individual belief within the group and strengthened expression in the public 
arena on behalf of the group and its beliefs.184 
Protection for such expressive associations has also afforded the 
members of such groups privacy from unwanted public disclosure, on the 
theory that the choice of group formation and association may be chilled by 
 
 180.  Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
 181.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 639 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 182.  Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458–60 (1958) (applying this 
principle to shield the NAACP from having to disclose its membership lists). 
 183.  See Farber, supra note 9, at 1488 n.31. 
 184.  See id. at 1484 nn.5–6. 
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public disclosure of the individual’s membership.185  Members may be 
inhibited by the loss of privacy in their thoughts and beliefs, the impact on 
friendships, jobs, and security that might result from shunning, or retaliation 
by other persons or groups, both private and governmental.186 
In light of Citizens United, are there any possible grounds upon which a 
business corporation can and should be excluded from the category of 
expressive associations?  Arguably, shareholders of a business corporation 
are in a position to protect their own privacy by simply selling their shares 
on the market.  The relationship with the corporation, in other words, is not 
permanent enough to warrant general First Amendment protection.  This has 
never been a very persuasive rationale, in large part because selling shares is 
arguably harder and more costly than simply terminating membership in 
another form of organization.  One can cancel membership in the ACLU or 
NRA more easily and cheaply than selling one’s shares in IBM. 
The distinction between the ACLU and IBM rests rather on a value 
judgment that beliefs about civil rights are more central under the First 
Amendment than beliefs about commerce.187  But granting full free speech 
rights to business corporations and their expression places this distinction in 
considerable doubt.188  If the corporation’s speech is fully protected, then it 
must be as important as religious, ideological, and governance interests 
(such as civil rights).189  The purely self-interested commercial element 
exists on the side in the commercial speech doctrine—in the field of 
advertising for the buying or selling of products alone—where, ironically, 
there likely is broad agreement with the messages on the part of the 
shareholders/members. 
Should group affiliation and action in support of the profit aims of a 
business corporation in the commercial market be enough for expressive 
association qualification?  As to such values and purposes as commercial 
success, deregulation, honesty in conduct, skill in pricing, originality, and 
business success in a capitalistic market, it is hard in light of Citizens United 
to deny the corporation and its shareholders/members protection under the 
expressive association umbrella.190  As the Court said in Citizens United, 
 
 185.  See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 639 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 188.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (“The First Amendment does not 
permit Congress to make these categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker 
and the content of the political speech.”). 
 189.  See id. 
 190.  See id. at 913. 
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these and related business matters and interests are critically important to the 
public in the marketplace of ideas.191 
Do sufficiently coherent common values exist among shareholders of 
business corporations to justify expressive association status?  Or, put  
differently, outside of the commercial speech context, are there sufficient 
shared beliefs and convictions on matters of public policy among the 
corporate membership to support a constitutional right of the corporation to 
speak on behalf of the members, and thus for the members to claim 
constitutional protection for their affiliation with the corporation?  Where do 
business corporations fall on the heterogeneous to homogeneous spectrum? 
This was an issue left unexplored in Citizens United.  But there are two 
possible approaches to its answer—both leading to the conclusion that a 
business corporation is not an expressive association. 
a.  Horizontal Heterogeneity 
One might argue that the common values among IBM shareholders are 
no less consistent than the common values of ACLU members.  The ACLU 
takes many positions, nationally and locally, and engages in a broad range of 
specific litigation, lobbying, and political persuasion.192  Individual members 
often, indeed regularly, disagree strongly with some or many of the positions 
the ACLU takes.193  But they are united in the importance of civil liberties 
and the watchdog role the organization plays in the system.194  This is 
arguably no different than the IBM shareholder, who may disagree with 
many of IBM’s corporate and expressive choices, but who believes strongly 
in the private ownership of property and the free enterprise system, as well 
as in IBM’s success in that system.  Absent a distinction between economic 
and political interests, it seems difficult if not impossible to justify treating 
the ACLU and IBM differently.  More importantly, the Citizens United court 
rejected any such distinction in open and forceful language.195 
But, for expressive associations, the question is not the presence or 
substance of a common interest, like selling Chevys, but instead the 
individual shareholder’s relation to the interest as one to be accomplished for 
them as individuals through the corporation’s expressive acts.  For the 
ordinary publicly-held business corporation, the shareholder’s interest 
cannot be described in this way.  The shareholder may love Chevys quite 
 
 191.  See id. 
 192.  ACLU, supra note 147. 
 193.  See Pemberton, supra note 148. 
 194.  See ACLU, supra note 147. 
 195.  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (“The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make 
these categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the 
political speech.”). 
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apart from GM’s success.  As an investor in GM, the shareholder’s interest 
is entirely individual and atomistic: value and return on investment.  The 
shareholder is much like the member of Jaycees, whose stake is not the 
organization’s expression of their philosophy, but instead its valuable 
experience and training in the art of marketing and public relations, which 
benefits the member individually and not in a collective expressive way.196 
b.  Vertical Heterogeneity 
The second argument is that common interests and shared beliefs are 
simply not relevant under the First Amendment after Citizens United.  If the 
business corporation (independent of its shareholders or members) has its 
own speech rights, the need for common interests and beliefs on the part of 
shareholders and members has been necessarily eliminated, and therefore the 
same result must hold for any expressive association claim.  The expressive 
association right, it should be recalled, is necessarily premised on a First 
Amendment speech right: either by the individual member rights-holders for 
whom the corporation speaks, ventriloquist-like; or by the corporate entity 
itself that speaks for its members, even if they agree or intend not to speak 
through their ownership.197  It is the latter model that Citizens United quite 
explicitly adopted, not to the exclusion of the first model, but alongside it 
and, indeed, often absorbing it.198 
In the end, however, there is a seemingly insuperable obstacle to treating 
the conventional business corporation as an expressive association.  In those 
corporations (or, for that matter, other forms of organization) that practice 
the legal separation of management and shareholders, the associational 
quality of the speaker is fatally undermined, for the association members are 
insufficiently connected to the speech communicated by the association for 
the members.199 
 
 196.  See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612–13 (1984) (“The objective of the Jaycees, as 
set out in its bylaws, is to pursue ‘such educational and charitable purposes as will promote and 
foster the growth and development of young men’s civic organizations in the United States, designed 
to inculcate in the individual membership of such organization a spirit of genuine Americanism and 
civic interest, and as a supplementary education institution to provide them with opportunity for 
personal development and achievement and an avenue for intelligent participation by young men in 
the affairs of the community, state and nation, and to develop true friendship and understanding 
among young men of all nations.’”). 
 197.  See generally id.; Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 891–917. 
 198.  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899–908. 
 199.  Cf. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 169, at 6 (generally discussing the business implications of 
the separation of ownership and control in a corporation). 
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The purpose of an expressive association is to serve the beliefs and 
goals of the members individually.200  In an outward-focused association, 
this means that the organized group’s expression must be closely tailored to 
the beliefs and expressive intentions of the members or shareholders, and 
those who manage the speech by the organization must be closely tethered to 
the intentions of the membership.201  This implies a relationship between 
owners and managers that is quite distinct from the discretion afforded 
officers in a business corporation, who make decisions for the corporation as 
a separate enterprise.202  Those values are structural and not specific for the 
individual shareholders; they are part of the transactional terms when shares 
are purchased.203  They do not take individualized, belief-based, shape—
other than in the atomized investment purposes of each individual 
shareholder.204  They do not, in other words, qualify as beliefs and aims of 
the individual for the group (corporation) that reflects them. 
Is this conclusion different in the context of a small, privately-owned or 
even individually-owned business?  It appears not to be.  For the small 
business with limited owners, the aims and organization of the business are 
not analytically distinct for expressive association purposes.205  The 
businesses are most often run just like a larger corporation: they are 
managed for profit and value, and decisions are made by management for 
the benefit of the business entity and its success, not for and on behalf of the 
expressive needs of a group.206  The investor/shareholder/partner interests 
are individualized and economic—atomized at the individual level.207  Most 
such organizations, unless they are structured around a set of non-business 
beliefs and goals that determine the group’s actions, are both horizontally 
and vertically heterogeneous. 
A different analysis applies to the business owned by one individual—
the sole proprietor or private corporation model.  In such cases, the business 
is the alter ego of the owning individual or, perhaps, family.208  It may 
pursue expressive ends dictated by the owner.  But it would not do so, 
 
 200.  See Christian A. Malanga, Expressive Association—Student Organizations’ Right to 
Discriminate: A Look at Public Schools’ Nondiscrimination Policies and Their Application to 
Christian Legal Society Student Chapters, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 757, 759 (2007). 
 201.  See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 202.  See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 169, at 6. 
 203.  Cf. id. 
 204.  Cf. id. 
 205.  See What Is SBA’s Definition of a Small Business Concern?, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., 
http://www.sba.gov/content/what-sbas-definition-small-business-concern (last visited Oct. 6, 2012). 
 206.  See id. (defining a small business as a business “that is independently owned and operated, is 
organized for profit, and is not dominant in its field”). 
 207.  Cf. id. 
 208.  Raymond T. Nimmer, Sole Proprietorships, in 1 COMMERCIAL ASSET-BASED FINANCING § 
2:6 (2012). 
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generally, as an association or group, but instead as an individual who, of 
course, has a full measure of free speech rights to be exercised through the 
corporation or business.  It would not be an expressive association, however, 
simply but fundamentally because it is not a group, but an individual who 
owns and controls it.209 
For these reasons, in the modern business corporation, the associational 
claim should not be recognized at all.  The association—for that is truly 
what most corporations (and their kin) are—is simply too heterogeneous to 
qualify as an expressive association under the First Amendment. 
C.  Form and Formless Associations 
Our final typology in this mapping exercise explores the form of 
expressive associations. 
1.  The Strange Case of Doe v. Reed210 
We begin our exploration of form in expressive associations with the 
recent case of Doe v. Reed,211 in which form played a mysterious, if not 
wholly inscrutable, role.  Accordingly, the facts of the Doe case nicely 
present the question of form at its most elemental level. 
a.  Context and the Court’s Decision in Doe 
The Doe v. Reed case began in Washington State, where referendum 
petitions are part of the public record and the names and addresses of 
petition signers are available to everyone on the internet.212  The plaintiff 
Does signed a petition seeking to place a recently enacted everything-but-
marriage gay-rights law on the ballot to be weighed by the electorate in a 
general election.213 The petition itself was a success, gaining sufficient 
signatures to suspend the everything-but-marriage law until a state-wide 
referendum vote.214 
Before the referendum, the State of Washington decided to publish the 
 
 209.  See id. 
 210.  Portions of this section are drawn in edited form from a chapter on the Doe case in the 
forthcoming book, RANDALL P. BEZANSON, TOO MUCH FREE SPEECH (2012). 
 211.  John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010). 
 212.  Id. at 2815. 
 213.  Id. at 2815–16. 
 214.  Id. 
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names and addresses of all petition signatories on the internet, as they 
qualified as public records under the Washington public records law.215  The 
petition signers sued to block disclosure of their names and addresses, 
claiming that publication of their names and addresses by the State would 
violate their First Amendment rights.216 
The Court’s opinion, by Chief Justice Roberts, was brief, and its 
sparseness left the definition of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim 
unclear: 
The compelled disclosure of signatory information on referendum 
petitions is subject to review under the First Amendment.  An 
individual expresses a view on a political matter when he signs a 
petition under Washington’s referendum procedure.  In most cases, 
the individual’s signature will express the view that the law subject 
to the petition should be overturned.  Even if the signer is agnostic 
as to the merits of the underlying law, his signature still expresses 
the political view that the question should be considered “by the 
whole electorate.”  In either case, the expression of a political view 
implicates a First Amendment right.217 
Justice Thomas addressed more clearly the First Amendment interest he 
believed was threatened by disclosure of the petition names: 
This Court has long recognized the “vital relationship between” 
political association “and privacy in one’s associations,” and held 
that “[t]he Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of 
political associations and beliefs.” This constitutional protection 
“yield[s] only to a subordinating interest of the State that is 
compelling, and then only if there is a substantial relation between 
the information sought and an overriding and compelling state 
interest.”218 
In order to explore the expressive association claim in Doe, and largely 
fill in an area left unaddressed by the Court, it is essential that the precise 
nature of the constitutional claim in the case be defined.  The case did not 
involve a state restriction on the vote or its expressive message.219  Instead, 
the relevant state action for First Amendment purposes was the 
 
 215.  Id. at 2816. 
 216.  Id. at 2816–17. 
 217.  Id. at 2817. 
 218.  Id. at 2839 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 219.  See, e.g., id. at 2829 (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining the nature of the case and lack of 
any vote restriction issues). 
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government’s distinct act of disclosing the vote—in this case the name of the 
referendum signator and, thus, the signator’s vote—in other words, 
disclosure of how the signator voted.220 
In fact, the claimed state action was even narrower, because disclosure 
of the names still did not reveal the reason behind a signator’s support for 
the referendum.221  Even if a person signed the petition mistakenly, or did so 
for reasons other than supporting a referendum on the gay rights legislation, 
according to the Chief Justice, the act of signing or voting was still 
expressive, and the state disclosure of the signator’s name and address still 
triggered First Amendment scrutiny.222 
Even setting aside problems with that attribution assumption, should the 
State’s disclosure be enough to trigger First Amendment protection?  Here 
matters become even murkier.  Does the revelation of one’s personal view 
through a general rule of state disclosure qualify as a First Amendment 
claim?  It could, under certain conditions, but those seem unlikely.  General 
state disclosure may qualify for First Amendment protection, for example, if 
the First Amendment contains a very strong right of anonymous speech that 
(a) entitles an individual to force nondisclosure of his or her preference (here 
an attributed meaning given to the simple act of signing); (b) applies even 
though the State’s action stems from a general public-records regime 
(consider, for example, e-mail to a public official or candidate for office); 
and (c) applies even if the voter/signer did not seek anonymity at the time of 
the expressive act or even claim afterward that simple disclosure, as opposed 
to disclosure that could result in threats of harm, would be problematic.223 
The likelihood that Doe invoked such a right is very, very slim indeed. 
First, such a strong claim would destroy public disclosure laws generally, 
and would do so in the political arena with particular force.224  Second, Doe 
was decided shortly after the Court’s broad conclusions, expressed in 
Citizens United, that disclosure does not prevent or restrict speech and that 
the federal disclosure regime for political contributions and expenditures 
was perfectly constitutional.225  It is hard to imagine an anonymity claim 
 
 220.  See id. 
 221.  See id. 
 222.  Id. at 2818 (majority opinion). 
 223.  For further discussion on Doe v. Reed and anonymous speech see Chesa Boudin, Note, 
Publius and the Petition: Doe v. Reed and the History of Anonymous Speech, 120 YALE L. J. 2140 
(2011). 
 224.  See Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2164 (“The modern right to anonymous speech is in tension with a 
parallel doctrine of disclosure.”). 
 225.  See id. at 2821; Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). 
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strong enough to explain Doe yet coexist with Citizens United. 
b.  Formless Association 
It is thus difficult, if not impossible, to view state disclosure of a petition 
vote as a violation of a First Amendment right to free speech.  This leaves 
only one remaining claim: a right to the privacy of expressive association.226  
Such a claim, to be clear, would in theory be that the State’s disclosure of 
the signer’s mute act would compromise his or her right of expressive 
association.227  The act of signing would represent a real or attributed 
message of affiliation with an association of like-minded people.228  This, in 
turn, would inhibit or restrict the signer’s right to so affiliate or associate for 
purposes of expression—not expression through voting, but expression 
through affiliation with others through messages and beliefs expressed 
privately within the group or publicly through public speech or expressive 
action (like a public sit-in or protest or advertisement).229 
Such a claim would rest on an interest in privacy.230  That is, not strictly 
a claim of anonymity, but instead a First Amendment interest in keeping 
one’s affiliations and associations in groups confidential, lest the very 
purposes of the groups—to engage in private forms of expression and 
inquiry—be defeated.231  The claim, in other words, is group and affiliation 
oriented, unlike the anonymity claim, which is individually isolated.  It is 
also a claim resting on personal inhibition of expression through affiliation, 
not, as the Court seemed to treat it in Doe, a claim of physical safety 
compromised by threats or intimidation by others.232 
Such an expressive association claim rests on the person’s mental state 
and personal preferences.  In theory, such a claim could have been made in 
Doe, but the Chief Justice didn’t expressly refer to it.  Only Justice Alito233 
and, more fully, Justice Thomas,234 addressed and supported such a claim.  
 
 226.  See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–63 (tracing the NAACP’s 
claim along these lines). 
 227.  See id. 
 228.  See id. 
 229.  See generally Christopher R. Edgar, The Right to Freedom of Expressive Association and the 
Press, 55 STAN. L REV. 191, 192–93 (2002). 
 230.  See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462. 
 231.  See id. 
 232.  See Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2825 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Once again, permitting the government 
to require speakers to disclose such information runs against the current of our associational privacy 
cases.  But more important, when speakers are faced with a reasonable probability of harassment or 
intimidation, the State no longer has any interest in enabling the public to locate and contact 
supporters of a particular measure—for in that instance, disclosure becomes a means of facilitating 
harassment that impermissibly chills the exercise of First Amendment rights.”). 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. at 2838–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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The identity and nature of the expressive association at issue in Doe was 
thus almost completely unclear and surprisingly unlimited. 
In previous expressive-association cases there has always been an 
association, or a formal affiliation of some kind, that could be identified and 
judged for First Amendment purposes.235  Such affiliations had traditionally 
been formal membership groups with their own expressive missions and 
activities.236  Examples from the cases abound: the NAACP; Rotary Clubs; 
the Jaycees; the Boy Scouts; churches; religions; religious and philosophical 
groups; political organizations, such as PACs; campaign committees; and so 
forth.237  Even corporations may claim to be affiliations for the purposes of 
expressive-association protection.238  But missing in Doe is any requirement 
that a particular belief or affiliation be identified, or even exist, or that any 
group, large or small, formal or informal, be shown to be engaged in 
expressive activity.239  Indeed, it seems clear from the circumstances in 
which the case arose and the evidence upon which it relied that no 
identifiable affiliation or group existed for the Does or other anonymous 
claimants.240  Nor was such a group alleged to be involved in any way.241 
This reveals the two central problems in Doe, both of which are 
instructive on the expressive-association issue.  First, the Court recognizes a 
claim of speech based on a mute act—signing—whose message of belief is, 
at best, wholly a product of attribution by those who see nothing more than 
an act of signing, or voting, disclosed by the State.242  Second, and critical 
for our purposes, the message lacks any reference to a formal association.243 
The very idea of expressive association seems undermined by the 
apparent absence of any association upon which the Does rested their 
claimed freedom from public disclosure.244  What does that mean for the 
 
 235.  See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. 
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); NAACP, 
357 U.S. 449. 
 236.  E.g., Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. 640; Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. 537; Roberts, 468 U.S. 609; NAACP, 
357 U.S. 449. 
 237.  Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. 640; Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. 537; Roberts, 468 U.S. 609; NAACP, 357 
U.S. 449. 
 238.  Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 548–49 (noting that corporations have rights of expressive 
association). 
 239.  Doe, 130 S. Ct. 2811. 
 240.  See id.  There were groups, but no affiliation claimed by Does or others, as if affiliation were 
not relevant.  Id. 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Id. at 2818. 
 243.  See id. at 2815–21. 
 244.  See id. 
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nature and meaning of expressive association claims under the First 
Amendment?  Virtually all of the previous expressive association claims 
have rested on an association—a formal group or organization with 
ascertainable functions, practices, and beliefs or expressive missions.245  
Such a functional association arguably must exist because some 
organizational foundation is necessary to achieving the very expressive 
purposes the First Amendment seeks to protect. 
Expressive association may protect multiple interests.  Expressive 
groups support an individual’s formation and exploration of beliefs through 
interaction with like-minded or similarly inclined people.246  They comfort, 
reinforce, or challenge the individual.247  Such groups also enhance the 
power of individual beliefs or ideas as members speak and act together, as 
well as when they employ organizational methods not available to 
individuals.248  The group can act collectively on their beliefs—politically, 
economically, morally, and ideologically.249  It can amplify and focus the 
message of its beliefs to the outside world.250  It can provide succor to those 
within the group—strengthening and reinforcing ideas, emotions, views, and 
beliefs.251 
Typically, an expressive association is built on a belief or set of ideas.  
As the Supreme Court has made clear, qualifying First Amendment 
expressive associations do not include mere social clubs or groups whose 
specific reasons for existing cannot be reduced to clear focus, like the Rotary 
Club or the Jaycees.252  The reason, from a First Amendment perspective, is 
that expressive associations are protected because they serve as alternative 
forms by which the individual’s own beliefs can be expressed and 
explored.253  It is expression that is the important common denominator. 
There is nothing in the Doe case to suggest that the Does signed the 
Washington referendum as members of a group or in coordination with a 
belief-based association.254  All the signators did was sign a petition, an 
expressively ambiguous act, at best.255  The motivations of individual 
signators cannot be ascertained simply by noting this act alone.  The fact that 
 
 245.  See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 246.  Malanga, supra note 200, at 759. 
 247.  See id. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  E.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). 
 250.  See, e.g., Welcome to the Christian Legal Society, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, 
http://www.clsnet.org/ (last visited Sep. 26, 2012). 
 251.  See, e.g., id. 
 252.  See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 253.  See supra Part III.A. 
 254.  See John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2011). 
 255.  Id. at 2813. 
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there were groups actively involved in the petition and referendum process 
on all sides—religious and political—is legally irrelevant and hardly even 
mentioned in the many pages of opinions.256 
c.  An Alternative Approach: Privacy and Freedom from Association 
An alternative approach to understanding the Court’s Doe decision is 
that the constitutional interest in the case is freedom from compelled or 
unwanted expressive association, possibly akin to the Court’s freedom from 
compelled speech doctrine.257  The argument would go something like this: 
the government should not use disclosure to compel individuals to affiliate 
or associate with one or more groups with which the individual disagrees or, 
at least, chooses not to join.  This protection may apply even if the 
compulsion stems from a general government program and results from 
affiliation and association that is purely a function of attribution by others. 
Would such a claim make constitutional and logical sense?  If the 
compelled association were the direct result of the government’s acts and 
involved a requirement of real association, the claim would make sense and, 
more importantly, consist of a conventional freedom of association (or non-
association) claim.  That is, the value of associations—the value of gathering 
with people who share one’s own beliefs or expressed views—is disrupted 
by a compelled arrangement.258  Forced association, against an individual’s 
will and contrary to his or her views, would violate the very constitutional 
purposes that support the protection of associations.259 
But applying this alternative approach to Doe creates serious problems.  
The government is compelling nothing and, indeed, it is saying nothing.  It is 
simply disclosing an already public act with clearly ambiguous expressive 
significance.260  Disclosure does not force participation in any group—like a 
pro-beef group, or a non-pacifist group in New Hampshire.  If by attribution 
one is forced, as the Court said Maynard was, to carry and publish a 
disagreeable view, ample recourse would be available in the compelled-
 
 256.  See id. 
 257. See W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 
705 (1977). 
 258.  See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2836 (“That would have been utterly implausible, since the inhabitants of 
the Colonies, the States and the United States had found public voting entirely compatible with “the 
freedom of speech” for several centuries.”). 
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speech doctrine and in the privacy and defamation torts.261  Association, 
except in the loosest sense of the term, is not pertinent in any way. 
A classic expressive association claim rests on the notion that 
individuals will be inhibited in speaking through and with groups and 
associations.262  The relevant harm to the First Amendment right, in other 
words, is inhibition in its exercise, not the suffering of any particular and 
limited form of harm like physical threats and intimidation.263  The proof of 
harm consists not of the likelihood of physical threats, as in Doe, but in the 
state of mind of the claimants who are moved not to undertake risk of 
consequences, whatever their nature and notwithstanding their uncertainty.  
The evidence consists of testimony of persons who will not join expressive 
groups in the absence of protection from disclosure of their vote and the 
reasonableness of their apprehension in the surrounding circumstances—not, 
as in Doe, of proof of violence against signers or, perhaps, its almost certain 
occurrence in the near future.264 
Why was the Court’s approach to the Doe case so much narrower?  A 
broader associational claim based on the more general harm of inhibition—a 
particularly tenable claim—would be legally uncontainable, and thus would 
seriously threaten the disclosure regime that the Court had recently given its 
constitutional blessing in Citizens United.265  Disclosure alone, the Court 
said, doesn’t prevent anyone from voting, or from joining groups or 
associations in speaking in a campaign setting.266  So much, then, for the 
classic and traditional expressive-association claim, and, in fact if not in 
legal fiction, so much for the Court’s statement that signing a petition, or 
voting, is an expressive act protected by the First Amendment free-speech 
guarantee. 
Without an identifiable form or group identity, without a remedy 
oriented to affiliation and belief, without any need for affiliation, the 
expressive association claim is like a boat with neither sail nor rudder—
formless, inert, and directionless.  Form, affiliation, and collective 
expressive action matter.  Thus, for an expressive association to exist, some 
tangible form must be discernible. 
 
 261.  See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713 (holding that New Hampshire could not constitutionally require 
individuals to participate in dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on their private 
property, and, therefore, that the state could not require plaintiffs to display state motto upon their 
vehicle license plates). 
 262.  E.g., Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 648 (“The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group 
infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a 
significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.”). 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Compare Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2816, with Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 648. 
 265. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914–16 (2010). 
 266.  Id. at 914. 
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2.  Expressive Ambiguity in Belief or Message 
One of Doe’s weaknesses as an expressive association case was the 
absence of a formal association.  The other is the ambiguity of the 
expression: as discussed above, affixing one’s name to a petition says little 
about the motivations and ideas that underlie an individual’s support for a 
referendum.267  In the Doe case, therefore, a group’s expression was unclear 
because of the uniform simplicity of the expressive act (signing a petition).  
The Court, however, had struggled with an association’s expressive clarity 
only several years before, in Rumsfeld v. FAIR.268  Unlike Doe, the lack of 
clear expression in FAIR was based on the diffused structure of the 
association itself.269 
a.  Introduction to Rumsfeld v. FAIR 
In expressive association cases, determining the coherence of a group’s 
message is essential: if the Court is to protect group speech under the idea of 
expressive association, the existence and strength of the expression is 
arguably as important as the existence and strength of the association.  As 
the Court noted in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, expressive association is valuable 
because “[t]he right to speak is often exercised most effectively by 
combining one’s voice with the voices of others.”270  Thus, the group’s 
message itself must also have form. 
The Court has long included the existence of expression in its list of 
requirements when applying expressive association, but has not delved 
deeply into analysis of the depth and coherence of that expression.271  FAIR 
centered on the application of the Solomon Amendment, which requires 
educational institutions to provide military recruiters equal access to 
students.272  If any part of an institution fails to provide military recruiters 
with a level of student access equal to the access provided to the most-
privileged recruiters, the institution loses a portion of its federal funding.273 
FAIR is a coalition of law schools and law school faculties opposing 
 
 267.  See supra Part IV.C.1.c. 
 268.  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 68–70 
(2006). 
 269.  Id. at 68. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  E.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 649 (2000). 
 272.  FAIR, 547 U.S. at 56. 
 273.  Id. 
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discrimination.274  Its rallying cry—and the coalition’s first project—was the 
overturning of the Solomon Amendment.275  Faculty members at coalition 
schools objected to the military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy, and sought 
to respond to the policy by restricting military recruiters’ access to 
students.276  The Solomon Amendment threatened to strip funding in 
response to those policies.277 
FAIR challenged the Solomon Amendment on First Amendment 
grounds, focusing on free speech claims and arguing, in essence, that by 
requiring law schools to provide military recruiters with access to students, 
the government was restricting the schools’ free speech—or, at least, 
compelling speech.278  There are several overlapping speech issues in FAIR: 
whether the Solomon Amendment restricts speech or conduct,279 whether the 
act of providing access to students qualifies as expression (and therefore 
qualifies for First Amendment protection),280 and whether requiring a law 
school to host speech it opposes violates the school’s First Amendment 
rights.281  The opinion also addresses whether the Amendment 
unconstitutionally restricts the law school’s expressive conduct.282 
Only in the opinion’s final section did Justice Roberts center on the idea 
of expressive association.283  He begins by explaining that the Court, in Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale, already “recognized a First Amendment right to 
associate for the purpose of speaking”284—the right of expressive association 
that is the focus of this piece.  In Dale, the Court had held that the New 
Jersey public accommodations law requiring the group to include a 
homosexual scoutmaster impaired the Boy Scouts’ message opposing 
homosexuality.285 
The law schools relied on the Court’s reasoning in Dale to make what 
they felt was a similar argument: their message included opposition to 
discrimination and military policies were discriminatory; therefore, hosting 
 
 274.  Id. at 47. 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  The Court found that the Solomon Amendment “affects what law schools must do—afford 
equal access to military recruiters—not what they may or may not say.”  Id. at 60. 
 280.  The Court concluded that the speech compelled by the Amendment—for example, emails 
relaying an interview schedule—“is plainly incidental to the Solomon Amendment’s regulation of 
conduct” and therefore allowable.  Id. at 62. 
 281.  The Court found that requiring a law school to allow military interviewers access did not 
compromise the law school’s message.  Id. at 63. 
 282.  Id. at 65–66. 
 283.  Id. at 68–70. 
 284.  Id. at 68. 
 285. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655–59 (2000). 
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military recruiters on campus impaired their message and violated their right 
to speech.286  The Court disagreed, finding the law schools’ plight 
distinguishable from the Boy Scouts’.287  The Court begins its analysis with 
its own summary of the holding in Dale: 
[T]he Boy Scouts’ freedom of expressive association was violated 
by New Jersey’s public accommodations law, which required the 
organization to accept a homosexual as a scoutmaster.  After 
determining that the Boy Scouts was an expressive association, that 
the forced inclusion of Dale would significantly affect its 
expression, and that the State’s interests did not justify this 
intrusion, we concluded that the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment 
rights were violated.288 
That holding requires at least five separate determinations: (1) Is the 
organization in question an association?289  (2) Is it expressive (does it have 
a message)?290  (3) Does the law in question require inclusion of another 
member?291  (4) Does that inclusion impair the association’s expression (its 
“message”)?292  (5) Does the significance of this intrusion outweigh any 
competing state interest?293  Presumably, only if the court can answer “yes” 
to all five questions will it hold the law unconstitutional. 
The Court’s decision in Rumsfeld v. FAIR focuses squarely on the third 
question.294  Requiring law schools to host military recruiters, the Court 
reasoned, does not require the coalition to include the recruiters in their 
association: “Recruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus 
for the limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to become members 
of the school’s expressive association. . . .  Unlike the public accomodations 
law in Dale, the Solomon Amendment does not force a law school to accept 
members it does not desire.”295  The Court made it clear that it is the court, 
not the association, that determines whether the association’s message is 
 
 286.  FAIR, 547 U.S. at 68. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 289.  Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 647–48. 
 290.  Id. at 648–53. 
 291.  Id. at 646–47, 657. 
 292.  Id. at 653–56. 
 293.  Id. at 657–59. 
 294.  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 69 
(2006). 
 295.  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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impaired: “[A] speaker cannot ‘erect a shield’ against laws requiring access 
‘simply by asserting’ that mere association ‘would impair its message.’”296 
b.  Mixed Messages and the Court’s Silence 
The Court’s analysis of inclusion seems sound: hosting a group on 
campus is quite different from accepting a new member, and because the law 
does not force inclusion, it does not compromise the group’s message.297  
More interesting, though, is what the Court chose not to address in FAIR.  
By focusing on a single aspect of the Dale test, the Court declined to address 
difficult questions related to the other elements.298 
For example, even if the Court determines that FAIR qualifies as an 
association, it remains unclear whether a group comprised of faculties from 
multiple law schools is sufficiently cohesive to engage in common 
expression.  Does FAIR have a clear message?  What is that message?  Is it 
anti-discrimination?  Or is it anti-military discrimination?  Or is it anti-
Solomon Amendment?  This question is important, and it is one that the 
Court declines to address in either Dale or FAIR.  The Court seems content 
to allow the association to declare what its message is.299  But the Court 
explicitly refuses to allow groups to determine whether the inclusion of a 
dissenting voice will compromise its message—that role the Court reserves 
for itself.300  This creates an obvious conflict: if the group declares itself 
anti-Solomon Amendment, for example, the Court will have a hard time 
deciding that the Solomon Amendment does not compromise the group’s 
message. 
Though it was FAIR that brought suit, the Court focused on whether law 
schools are expressive organizations, a peculiar decision based, apparently, 
on FAIR’s own pleadings.301  The Court, however, provides no analysis as to 
whether a law school qualifies as an association (we would presume that it 
does) and as expressive (a more open question).  The Court does conclude 
that FAIR has “plainly overstat[ed] the expressive nature of their activity 
and the impact of the Solomon Amendment on it,” but this conclusion is not 
expanded into individual analysis of the association and its expression.302 
Given other opportunities to address the nature of group expression—
which would, in all likelihood, require the Court to investigate more 
carefully what an expressive association’s message truly is—the Court has 
 
 296.  Id. (quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000)). 
 297.  Id. at 69. 
 298.  Id. 
 299.  See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653–54 (2000). 
 300.  FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64–65. 
 301.  Id. at 68–70. 
 302.  Id. at 70. 
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similarly refused to do so.303 
In his concurrence to the Citizens United decision, Justice Scalia 
reasoned that because the Constitution did not distinguish between 
individual speakers and associated speakers, the case (like the First 
Amendment) was about “‘speech,’ not speakers.”304  That rhetorical flourish 
allows Scalia to sidestep analysis of whether a corporation, even if it is an 
association for First Amendment purposes, can be considered an expressive 
one.  What, though, is a corporation’s expression?  Presumably its purpose is 
maximizing shareholder wealth.305  That goal does not lend itself to a clear 
expression the way a pro-choice group’s goals (preventing abortions) or 
even the Jaycees’ goals (helping young men develop personal and leadership 
skills)306 would. 
Similarly, in his dissent in Doe v. Reed, Justice Thomas suggests that 
signers of a petition qualify as members of an association, using a very 
broad definition of the term.307  Because (1) the signers have a “common 
view,” (2) more than one signer is needed to place a petition on a ballot, and 
(3) the signers joined with “a state political action committee” by signing the 
petition, Thomas reasoned that, “signing a referendum petition amounts to 
‘political association.’”308 
Thomas goes on to agree with Roberts’s majority opinion,309 which 
reasons that “[a]n individual expresses a view on a political matter when he 
signs a petition”—either that he believes the law should be overturned, or, at 
the very least, that he believes “that the question should be considered ‘by 
the whole electorate.’”310  But those two views are distinctly different—
believing that a law should be overturned expresses opposition to the 
substance of the law, while believing that the entire electorate should 
consider an issue expresses a commitment to a particular political process.  
If, as the Court urges, we accept that expressive associations make 
individual speech stronger by amplifying it through the combination of 
multiple voices expressing a similar message,311 then how does sharing 
 
 303.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 304.  Id. 
 305.  See Bevis Longstreth, Reflections on the State of Corporate Governance, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 
113, 115 (1991). 
 306.  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984). 
 307.  John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2839 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Id. 
 310.  Id. at 2818 (majority opinion). 
 311.  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 68 
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space on a petition amplify one’s voice if others have joined the petition for 
entirely different reasons?  In short, there is a difference between an 
individual’s act being expressive and an association being expressive.  Even 
if the referendum signers share a common goal, one could still argue that 
having a goal is different than being expressive. 
In Christian Legal Society, both the majority312 and dissent313 note that 
CLS members sign a pledge that commits them to certain behaviors and 
beliefs.  But does this make the group expressive?  The dissent notes that 
“many of [Hastings’] registered groups were and are dedicated to expressing 
a message” and lists, as examples, a pro-choice group, a pro-life group, the 
American Constitution Society, and an animal-rights group.314  The fact that 
other campus groups are expressive, however, does not mean that CLS is, 
and the Court never fully addresses this question, nor proposes a test to 
determine what makes a group expressive.315  The examples the Court points 
to seem to all be dedicated to a clear, single cause.316 
CLS’s cause—and, more importantly for the Court’s analysis, its 
message or expression—is less clear: is it to promote faith, or  to oppose 
sin?317  The law school seemed to object to two portions of CLS’s by-laws: 
one that prohibited “unrepentant homosexual behavior” and another that 
prohibited “non-believers” from being members.318  Does the existence of 
more than one expressive purpose make the right of associative expression 
more difficult to apply?  Again, if we accept that expressive association 
should be protected because uniting individual voices bolsters each 
individual’s ability to speak, how does CLS, with its variety of loosely tied 
purposes, further that goal? 
c.  Total Dilution: Conglomerates as Thematic Groups 
The first cases that outlined the idea of expressive association protected 
groups from laws that would dilute their message by requiring inclusion of 
dissenting voices: protecting the Boy Scouts of America from a law that 
would require them to include a gay scoutmaster,319 for example, or the 
Jaycees from a law that would require them to include girls.320 
 
(2006). 
 312.  Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 
130 S. Ct. 2971, 2974, 2980 (2010). 
 313.  Id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 314.  Id. at 3002. 
 315.  Id. at 2971–95 (majority opinion). 
 316.  Id. at 2984–85. 
 317.  See generally About CLS, supra note 125. 
 318.  Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2974. 
 319.  Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 320.  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
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But Rumsfeld v. FAIR addressed a different kind of group: a group of 
groups, really, or what we will call a conglomerate—an association of law 
school faculties.321  FAIR, then, is a group of groups—a coalition of 
faculties—and even if we assume that the coalition is unified in its fight 
against discrimination (making the group homogenous), the subgroups are 
almost certainly not unified.  In fact, FAIR members join through faculty 
votes, indicating the strong possibility that not all faculty members embrace 
the faculty’s decision to join FAIR.322 
The Supreme Court did not express any concerns about applying the 
same analysis to a conglomerate that it had applied to groups of 
individuals.323  But conglomerates create several identifiable problems in 
expressive association analysis, one of which is a diluted—or even 
conflicted—group message. 
One common justification for protecting expressive association is that 
supporting association also supports speech: the Court in FAIR, referring to 
Jaycees, reasoned that “[t]he right to speak is often exercised most 
effectively by combining one’s voice with the voices of others.”324 
“Combining” is an interesting word to choose, because it allows for some 
variety of expression—using the word “unifying,” on the other hand, would 
have suggested that the individual speakers share identical views, which is 
often not the case. 
This justification for protecting expressive association, however, is 
strongest when the members’ views are very similar.325  The more the voices 
share, the more they resonate; the more diverse the viewpoints, the less 
likely it is that associating with group members helps you project your own 
voice. 
This rationale is problematic even in groups of individuals.  Members of 
the League of Women Voters, for example, may have dramatically different 
political views.  Is an individual member’s speech more effective because of 
that association?  To arrive at an agreed-upon message, often individual 
members would be required to omit personal beliefs that the group as a 
whole did not embrace—the voice may be louder, but it also must be 
simplified. 
 
 321.  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 52 
(2006). 
 322.  Id. 
 323.  Id. at 68. 
 324.  Id. 
 325.  Id. 
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This is doubly problematic for conglomerates: group messages are less 
sophisticated than individual voices, and conglomerate messages less 
sophisticated still.  The more levels of consensus and simplification a group 
incorporates, the less likely it is that the group truly makes an individual’s 
speech more effective. 
V.  CONCLUSION: PUTTING TOGETHER THE MAP 
Expressive associations are complex and varied in type, function, and 
relationship to the First Amendment.  The differences among them bear on 
the definitional questions with which we have been concerned in this 
mapping exercise.  More importantly, the differences bear on the basic 
reasons for constitutional protection and thus on the measures, or standards, 
by which the First Amendment interests should be protected. 
We conclude that there are four often overlapping elements of the 
expressive association landscape—or map. They emerge from two 
overarching assumptions we have made.  First, distinctions among 
expressive associations grounded on substantive preferences for certain 
ideas or kinds of ideas should be rejected. In this respect all expressive 
associations are identical under the First Amendment, whatever the nature of 
their shared beliefs.  Second, as a general rule we think it necessary and 
useful to think of an expressive association as little more than a 
representative of the constitutional interests of its members, not as an 
independent rights-holder.326  It is the associated activities of individual 
members that is at the heart of constitutional liberty.327  And the group is the 
instrument by which the individual members are served. 
With these background principles in mind, we identify four features of 
the map of expressive associations. 
First, expressive associations must be based on identifiable beliefs to 
which all members subscribe in fact.  Beliefs are at the heart of the very idea 
of expressive associations under the First Amendment.328  Moreover, this 
feature explains and supports the essential distinction between beliefs and 
status that was at the heart of the Supreme Court’s CLS opinion.  Status is 
not what the First Amendment is about. 
Second, a basic distinction should be drawn between inward- and 
 
 326.  This is the very approach taken by the Supreme Court in the NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson case, where the NAACP was given third party standing to represent the interests of 
individual members.  357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 327.  But see our discussion of mixed corporate and individual associations, and conglomerate 
associations, for some variants on this central principle.  Supra notes 208–09, 321–25 and 
accompanying text. 
 328.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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outward-oriented expressive associations.329  This essential distinction yields 
different measures of constitutional protection in view of different 
constitutional functions performed: when the activities are inward, and thus 
often deeply personal, the measure of constitutional protection differs from 
when expression is geared toward the public, with the primary function 
being brotherhood in shared beliefs and augmentation of personal views 
effected by the combination of many voices.  Inward is introspective and 
contemplative.  Outward is publicly expressive and largely mechanical in 
function.  The two types of expressive association activity are often 
combined—that is, performed by a single expressive association—but they 
must still be kept distinct in relation to any specific activity claimed to be 
protected. 
Third, individual membership must involve individual action and aims 
undertaken with and through the group or association, not independent of it.  
Affiliation focused on atomistic rewards for the individual should not be 
protected in the name of expressive association rather than, for example, 
individual free speech or self-improvement alone.330 
Fourth, elements of form are important to determining whether a group 
or an organization should qualify as an expressive association.331  The group 
or association must be non-transitory; it should have a formal identity, a 
mission and expressed set of beliefs, a duration, and some form of known 
membership by the individuals claimed as members.  Like-mindedness, 
without more, won’t do.  Moreover, the association should have some form 
of organizational structure and governance related to member beliefs and 
choices, for without these it cannot be said that the acts of the group 
represent the ideas and beliefs of the individual members.  Finally, 
conglomerate groups are unlikely to qualify as expressive associations 
because they almost always lack a coherent and core set of beliefs shared by 
all members—including the members of the groups in the conglomeration—
and also lack the governance discipline to maintain fidelity to the beliefs and 
mission of the collective sets of members.332 
Our map, in short, focuses on beliefs; consensus and cohesion; action by 
and through the group and for the group (not the individual); and a form 
necessary to maintaining the protected acts as those of the collective, not the 
individual or leadership or some portion of the membership. 
 
 329.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 330.  See supra Part IV.B.3.a. 
 331.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 332.  See supra Part IV.C.2.c. 
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